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Ongoing Analysis - Archive
2022.05.23
The main change over the last 4 weeks is the final capitulation of the Mariupol defenders who were surrounded in Azovstal. It is expected they will be held by Russia under severe circumstances, but finally be exchanged. Their names have been recorded by the ICRC.
Ukraine has pushed back Russian forces around Charkiv far enough to bring the city out of reach of standard artillery. Ukrainian forces may even have reached the Russian border at Ternova, north east of Charkiv. In Donbas, Russian forces have slowly advanced near Sievierodonetzk, while the Izium offensive has stalled. In the other regions, the situation remains unchanged, with some reports about guerilla activity in Melitopol and Enerhodar.
Russian losses continue to be quite high. At the same time, Ukrainian forces are receiving further modern weapon systems from the West. The Ukrainian government openly talks about an offensive at some point in the summer, but also makes clear that the war will continue for some time, into the winter or even longer. JCOT interprets this in such a way that Ukraine is seeking to bleed the Russian forces in Donbas, weakening them until Ukraine is ready for a counterattack. We are currently not seeing signs of a sudden breakdown of Russian forces, though.
It is difficult to estimate how an Ukrainian counter offensive will look. Maybe Ukraine will use the fact that the front line is now quite extended and core Russian forces mostly positioned in the Donbas area.
Some Western countries are looking at options to unblock the Russian sea blockade against Odesa. Anti ship weapons might play a role here, as well as protected convoys.
In Russia, some surprisingly open voices have started criticizing the war, from an execution standpoint as well as from a general one. The 1969 analysis of Andrei Amalrik, "Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984" which correctly predicted the fall of the USSR, triggered by a war (although in Afghanistan, not with China) is seen to be also pertinent to the current situation. According to this view of Russian history, aging authoritarian governments have participated in several wars which they all lost and which then led to their collapse or to massive internal reforms. This is true for the Crimean war 1853-56, the Russian-Japanese war 1904-05, the First World War and the Afghanistan war. It is highly probable that the current war, with losses over 3 months compareable to all losses in Afghanistan, will lead to a similar scenario if there is no nuclear escalation. But the fact that this pattern has been repeated 5 times with an average cycle time of 34 years makes it improbable that Russia will change fundamentally.
To break this cycle, the Russian education system will have to be changed, focussing on democratic and liberal behaviour and on a historic view which acknowledges Russia's dual colonial history - one colonialism against neighbouring peoples and another against their own rural population which always was seen as disposable by the elites.
It is no surprise that Russia is focussing mostly on the 1945 victory, as it is their only major military victory since the Napoleonic wars. Both these wars have in common that they were defense wars where Russia was able to use its extreme distances to its advantage.
2022.04.29
In the last few weeks, the situation has only slowly changed, at least on the surface. Mariupol still has not fallen, the defenders are encircled in the ruins of Azovstal. Kherson has not been liberated, either, but around Charkiv, Russian forces have been pushed back a bit. In the Donbas, though, Russian forces have advanced at some points, e.g. south of Izium.
What really has changed is the delivery of heavy weapons from the West. A high number of T72 tanks have been transferred to Ukraine from Poland and the Czech Republic according to the Dutch analyst Oryxspionenkop . Many other countries, even Germany, are also supplying heavy weapons, with training and delivery ongoing. Most significantly, the M777 howitzer is being supplied to Ukraine in larger numbers by several countries.
One psychologically important loss of Russia is the cruiser "Moskva" which was the command ship for the Russian Black Sea fleet. It was sunk by Ukrainian anti ship rockets, with a huge but unacknowledged loss of life on the Russian side. Also, there have been some explosions at Russian fuel and ammunition depots and also a weapons research facility.
The impact of Western heavy arms shipments, at the current moment, must be seen as relative low. The systems have to be transported to the front, and for many of these, training provided. In spite of this, Russian forces have made scant progress. This leads to the conclusion that in the next few weeks a reversal of the war might be observed. The Russian attempt to encircle the unoccupied Donbas cities, at the current speed, will probably not be completed in time. Precision artillery covering distances of 30 or more km will be able to destroy supply lines and depots. At the same time, the Russian arsenal of precision missiles has been used up to a large part.
As a result, we might see a relatively sudden breakdown of Russian forces in the Donbas and north-west of Kherson by end of May or in June. As soon as this becomes obvious to the Russian leadership, they will have to decide on further action, either pledging for an armistice or withdrawing their forces. The third alternative will be an attack with nuclear weapons on the supply lines in western Ukraine or even in other places. It is unclear how the reaction both of Ukraine and of NATO will be on such an attack. We believe that both the UK and the U.S. have set up plans for this contingency and have communicated some of the elements of these plans to the Russian leadership.
It is possible that even a limited nuclear attack on Ukrainian territory would be answered with a nuclear attack on Russian supply lines. An attack on NATO facilities e.g. in Poland would immediately result in a counterattack on a comparable railway and transport node in southern Russia. In any case, an escalation is not impossible. The only hope is that Russian officers in the command chain will stop this madness.
Seen from another perspective, the Russian attack on Ukraine assumes the form of a Greek tragedy. It contains heroes and villains, but both sides operate along lines which seem predetermined. The gods seem to send humanity to the brink of total destruction, maybe to shake us out of our complacency.
2022.04.03
The fierce resistance of Ukrainian forces has forced Russia to give up encircling Kyiv. As of today, all Russian forces are reported to have left the region north west of Kyiv and the "Sivershina" region, the north eastern corner of Ukraine. The withdrawn forces are assumed to be reorganized and sent towards the Donbas and Kherson regions. Reports and videos are showing major Russian war crimes perpetrated during the occupation of Kyiv suburbs. Russia is continuing its attacks on the other fronts, while being pushed back slowly in the vicinity of Kherson. Mariupol is expected to fall in the next few days, but forces there put up fierce resistance. Izium has fallen, but no other Ukrainian city has been occupied by Russian forces.
Several Ukrainian fuel depots, e.g. in Odesa, have been destroyed. Ukraine was able to destroy a fuel depot in Voronezh (Russia) with a helicopter attack.
2022.03.30
In some parts of Ukraine, the situation has slowly turned in favour of Ukraine. In the north west of Kyiv, Russian forces were pushed back from suburbs like Irpin, and Russian supply lines were diminuished. Russia has declared that they plan to focus on the Donbas region and is withdrawing or rotating some forces from the Kyiv area. But shelling of major cities has continued and pressure on Mariupol is continuing. According to reports, about 5'000 people have been killed in Mariupol.
In the south, the Ukrainian forces have gained ground at Kherson. Reports have been seen that Russian forces prepare for the destruction of the Dnepr bridge east of Kherson, which would make sense after a complete withdrawal from Kherson.
The situation in the north east of Ukraine is not fully clear. Chernihiv is mostly destroyed and surrounded, but has not fallen. Russian forces have been pushed back from Sumy. Almost no reports are available for Shostka.
Russia seems to run out of reserves, though. It has been announced that about 2000 Russian occupation troops from Georgia (Abkhasia & South Ossetia) are being moved towards Ukraine. In the Donbas statelets, people are randomly conscripted and sent to the front. Also, heavy arms drawn from the theoretically overwhelming Russian reserves are reported to often be in an unusuable state, missing electronics and sometime even engines. Western sources claim that Russia is now actively using 75% of its military potential (excluding naval and nuclear forces).
Ukraine is now actively using international volunteer forces, both from the West and from Belarus. Chechen volunteers have been active in Ukraine for many years. Now reports on a Russian volunteer force have been seen. The supply of modern arms is continuing, but no large weapons systems have been reported to be delivered.
We assume that the current war goals of Russia are to fully occupy the Donetzk and Luhansk oblasts, the Kherson oblast (maybe only south of the Dnepr) and the southern half of the Zaporizhzhia oblast, to supply Crimea with water and to create a land bridge to the Donbas. All activity in the northern parts of Ukraine serve to pin down Ukrainian troops. There might be some territories in the north east Russia is prepared to annex, but that would not fit in the "Novorossija" / Donbas story used by Russian propagandists.
Ukrainian forces probably will focus on pushing back Russians from Kiyv, possibly trying to cut Russian supply lines in the north west and those coming from the east via Konotop. An important goal is also to liberate Kherson and push Russian forces back to the southern / eastern bank of the Dnepr in the south. Guerilla action in the occupied regions is being prepared according to Ukrainian sources.
2022.03.23
The situation has developed only slowly from the last entry. None of the beleaguered cities have fallen, with Mariupol being under the greatest pressure as Russa wants to consolidate its rule over the Azov sea shore. Russian forces have committed war crimes by using cluster and phosphorous bombs and by shelling civilian buildings like hospitals or the Mariupol theatre which marked with a huge "Children" inscription visible from the air. More than 3 million Ukrainians have left the country, and about twice that number are refugees within Ukraine.
According to Ukrainian tracking, more than 15'000 Russian soldiers have lost their lives, with triple that number wounded. Six generals have been confirmed to have lost their lives. Equipment losses are also very high, with about 50% of Russian helicopters used in Ukraine destroyed. The stalled attack troops north west of Kyiv are assumed to be surrounded by Ukrainian forces, and in the Kherson region, Ukraine has successfully pushed back Russian forces. In eastern Ukraine, Russian forces have made some progress, but no major breakthroughs.
Weapon shipments to Ukraine are ongoing, with a focus on long range air defense weapons, especially S300 systems. Polish Mig 29 will probably not be delivered to Ukraine. NATO has moved Patriot batteries to the eastern border of Poland and Slovakia. These serve to defend NATO territory but might play a role in case of WMD usage by Russia.
Russia is trying to organize further forces without starting an official mobilization effort. There is no information about the success of this effort - the drive to hire Syrian mercenaries is assumed to fail, and Belarusian forces have not yet entered the conflict. There are reports that the Russian forces in this conflict consist to a large part of minority ethnies, which explains their low motivation.
According to current inforamtion, the command structure on the Russian side is not centralized in the person of a commanding general, which makes sense as this general, if "successful", would steal the glory from Putin and might even become a threat to the ruling civilian / FSB elite.
Politically, there have been no major steps towards a solution. Negotiations have stalled. Sanctions against Russia are biting, with queues at Russian food shops and pharmacies reported. Internal Russian propaganda has reached extreme levels, with a huge propaganda show in a stadium in Moscow.
2022.03.07
Sanctions starting to hit Russia, with both internal and external analysts pointing to summer for a complete economic breakdown. The Russian economy has not been "hardened" against sanctions over time (like eg the Iranian), which makes the impact harder. The level of popular support for the "Z" operation seems to be relatively high in Russia. In Belarus, it seems to be much lower, with several high level officials having left office. It must be assumed that the reason for not using Belarusian forces in Ukraine is the risk that whole units might switch sides.
Today, 30 Russian helicopters have been destroyed near Kherson by Ukrainian forces. This is significant as attack helicopters serve two important roles, securing supply transports and deploying airbourne units. With now about 20% of Russian helicopters destroyed, those operations may soon become difficult if one subtracts the proportion of helicopters which is under maintenance or otherwise not useable.
Mariupol, Charkiv, Sumy, Shostka, Chernihiv and other smaller cities are now more or less completely surrounded. Russia seems to be employing the "total destruction" method used against Grosny and Aleppo against these cities.
The high number of Russian losses (both soldiers and material) in combination with arms supplies flowing into Ukraine makes it improbable that Russia can win this conflict. Kyiv is not yet surrounded and might be better prepared for a longer siege than other Ukrainian cities. If Russian losses (including soldiers wounded or taken prisoner, both of which no numbers have been reported) continue on the current level, the Russian invasion force will break down within two to three months. The state of the Ukrainian army is less well documented, but it has the ability to add new staff both from experienced reservists from the Donbas arena and from abroad, while some types of additional equipment is being shipped in from the West.
Large scale pro-Ukrainian demonstrations have been reported also in Kazakhstan. This is significant as the current regime received Russian military support only in January. It is possible that President Tokayev is developing a strategy of indepence which would encompass a balancing act between China and Russia, and maybe a strategic usage of the nuclear know-how in that country. There are 18% Russians in Kazakhstan, which would make the country a clear target for partial annexion if Russia is able to conquer Ukraine.
2022.03.02
Most Ukrainian cities have been held against the agressor. Only in the south, larger cities have fallen (Kherson?, Melitopol, Berdjansk). Russian forces are mostly using roads for their progress, which opens the unoccupied countryside for attacks against the supply transports and simplifies attacks with aircraft and drones. We expect these attacks will increase as the Russian supply lines will get longer and therefore more exposed. This has been documented by videos of a Bayraktar attack on a rail train of fuel carriages, with other reports stating triple digit losses of tanks and trucks only partially confirmed. Often tanks and transport vehicles are simply being abandoned due to lack of fuel, which has been documented by videos.
At the same time, morale is falling quickly even in regular Russian troops. Air landing attempts seem to have failed in most cases, with huge losses in the troops involved. Near Sumy, a report states that a Russian unit is turning back home, with the officers no longer supporting the war.
The maritime landing in the Azov sea did succeed, but basically under the protection of land forces already present. A landing operation near Odessa is highly probable in the next two days, but without ground forces in the vicinity, it could become a massive failure. It is possible that Russia will try to land forces in Bessarabia instead, to open up a supply line from Transnistria. This would probably require an occupation of southern Moldova, as the land connection to Transnistria otherwise is only possible on the eastern bank of the Dnestr. An important factor in both cases is the state of Ukrainian coastal defense especially their land-sea missiles.
After one week of fighting, Russian troops have failed to show any major victories. Their "rapid decapitation" plan has failed at several levels, creating unity within Ukraine and within the West. Economically, the massive sanctions are creating a major shock which is already being felt by ordinary Russians. Supplies flowing into Ukraine, including volunteer manpower, are another factor which could lead to a Russian defeat in a much shorter timeframe than it originally was thought possible by JCOT.
Belarus
Belarusian troops have been reported to be active in north eastern Ukraine and to be prepared for incursions at the Ukrainian border. Their morale will probably be even lower than the Russian one. We expect that some units may even change sides instead of simply capitulating. The Belarusian army has a manpower of some 50'000 which of course cannot be fully deployed. Also, the north western parts of Ukraine in which it would act are forested and inhabited by the most nationalistic part of the Ukrainian population. Reports have been seen of Belarusian partisans active against railway infrastructure. It is possible that Ukrainian special forces could enter Belarus to support these partisans.
The proportion of the population supporting the government is much lower than in Russia, documented by the protests against the presidential elections in 2020 and also the 2022 referendum result, which in spite of massive pressure and probably electoral fraud only resulted in 65% "Yes" votes. Already, large protests against the war have been reported in Minsk. The political situation in Belarus is one of the keys to the conflict - civil and armed resistance or even a successful coup against Lukashenka would be a clear message to the Russian high command that the conflict is lost and Putin to be removed urgently.
Armistice Option
That leads to the conclusion that there are only two paths out of the quagmire for Russian commanders, assuming the "surge" of their last reserves plus Belarusian forces will fail in the next few days. Russian forces are already overstretched, making it rather improbable that parallel sieges around a double digit number of large Ukrainian cities can be successfully implemented. An Aleppo-like gradual destruction of cities under siege will not really help as it takes too much time without leading to outright capitulations.
The most reasonable path is an armistice declared by Russia, with the Crimea land bridge and Cherson peninsula to be held in the longer run and the territories occupied (in a certain sense) in the north east returned in a first round of negotiations. Ukraine will not sign a "peace treaty" giving up any territories, but an armistice would be possible, comparable to the one between North and South Korea. The occupied territories could be ruled by former president Yanukovich, operating as a Quisling figurehead of an South Ukrainian "Novy Rossia" statelet.
Nuclear Option
Unluckily, there is another path available. Putin probably understands that the pressure on Russia, even after an armistice, will squash the economy within one or two years. Internal political pressure is already mounting and will explode as soon as the losses of the invasion will become visible. Thus the chance that Putin will decide for the nuclear option is not as low as most analysts might think. Like the U.S. in WW 2, he could decide to destroy one or two mid size Ukrainian cities with nuclear weapons. Those would probably be traffic nodes located in the north western part of the country, thus also cutting supply lines, but not located directly at the border to avoid it being seen as a nuclear attack on NATO territory.
In contrast to a slow gradual destruction (Aleppo model), this will create a military political shock on a level which may lead to Ukrainian capitulation, especially if more attacks are threatened with. We estimate the probability that such an extreme command would be executed by the Russian army as 30-40%. This may be enough for Putin. There have been psychological preparations for this by Lavrov who claimed that Ukraine strives for nuclear weapons. We hope though that Russian commanders would deny such a command, immediately destroying Putins command authority. To avoid being punished for mutiny, the top level of Russian officers would obviously need to immediately execute a military coup and arrest Putin. Such a coup, even in localized form, could also take place after a tactical nuclear strike.
It is difficult to predict what the results of a tactical nuclear strike within Ukraine would be. While the Ukrainian government would probably capitulate immediately, a Russian occupation would meet even stiffer guerilla resistance than for a conventional occupation. The international echo would be extreme - China would have to choose to either implement their own blockade against Russia or itself being sanctioned heavily. Other nations supporting Russia in such a case would also be submitted to extreme pressure, even with military measures like sea and air blockades or even invasions. NATO would probably invoke Article 5, but not strike back with nuclear weapons at that point. World War 3 would be looming and could be triggered by any local event.
2022.02.26
Although Russian losses in the field are mounting, with stretched supply lines, it is not clear for how long Ukrainian cities will hold. Incursions into Kyiv were repelled. Nevertheless, the Russian plan to surrond and take Kyiv with a "rapid decapitation" seems to get stuck, both due to the mass resistance in Kyiv and due the stretched supply lines. Information is unclear, but also other attacks in the Donbas area and along the Black Sea coast are more or less stuck. The only Russian successes seems to be the Luhansk suburb Stanyzja Luhanska and partially Melitopol.
In addition to the attack on Kyiv, we expect Russian forces to focus on the attempt to create a land bridge from Donbas to Crimea. Mariupol and Berdjansk will make that plan difficult, though, in addition to the overstretched supply lines. Russian forces are currently taking the inland route over Tokmak to avoid those cities. We believe they plan to cut off the coastal cities this way, but the supply lines will be even more exposed.
Midterm, the biggest Russian issue is the ramping up of arms supplies via Western Ukraine. There, no ground incursions have been reported. Russian troops are assembling in the west of Belarus, but they do not seem to be equipped for a full scale attack. The Ukrainian border with NATO countries Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania is long and goes through forested and partially mountaineous area. Transport of smaller weapons can be done by private car if required. Many western countries do not hesitate to deliver anti air and anti tank weapons in addition to smaller arms,
To close this supply pipeline, Russia might decide to bomb roads and railroads in the region. We believe that even a nuclear attack with several battlefield weapons would be possible, regarding the current state of mind in which Russian commanders including the President would be. This would probably lead to Article 5 invoking by NATO.
Sanctions are slowly rising to an effective level. Several countries have blocked their airspace to Russian planes, among them Poland and the Czech Republic. This will have direct effect on air traffic from many other European countries. We expect any traffic will become indirect, eg via Finland. A Russian car freighter was stopped by the French navy. SWIFT sanctions are coming, with Germany and Hungary having given up opposition to them. Russia is expected to strike back at Western assets in Russia and has already cancelled airspace access to some countries.
If the situation of Russian forces does not improve significantly in the next 2 days, we believe it is possible that Russia suggests an armistice. We are not sure though if Ukraine will accept it without a full withdrawal of Russian troops.
2022.02.24
Air attacks were mostly directed at military facilities and especially airports. Although the rather old Ukrainian air defense was seemingly destroyed, Ukraine reported the destruction of at least 7 Russian planes and 4 attack helicopters, if not more. Videos of successful usage of Bayraktar drones were shown, with Russia claiming the destruction of 4 of the 12 (?) operated by Ukraine. The breakthrough of Russian land troops from Crimea and over the Dnepr towards Cherson is critical and will probably be amplified by a maritime landing operation. That points to a goal to occupy all or at least three quarters of Ukraine, not only a land bridge to Donbas or the eastern half of the country.
Progress from the north towards Kyiv has not been very fast. The airborne troops at Antonov airport west of Kiyv might be crushed if enough Ukrainian troops are assembled and able to attack during the night. On the Donbas contact line, resistance of Ukrainian forces has been good. Russian troops have reached Sumy and Charkiv in the east. Here the question is if the troops will try to enter the cities or block them.
The Ukrainian state seems to be able to operate in this situation, no signs of a fast capitulation. The population is calm, although there are first refugee streams within the country and over the border to Moldova. We expect a critical point if high numbers of refugees assemble in NW Ukraine while Russian forces attack and bomb them. This might lead to the institution of an Air Protection Zone, similar to Syria, but in this case encompassing a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. There are articles in the UN charter which allow exclusion of involved parties even in Security Council decisions, so this may become an UN mandate.
On the agressor side, prominent Russians are protesting the attack on Ukraine, including a relevant number of Duma deputees. This makes it possible that any attempt to conquer a large Ukrainian city, with high losses and destruction on both sides, will sway public and relevant opinion against Putin in the near future.
Internationally, it is no surprise China does not condemn the Russian war of agression. If Russia is successful with the invasion and absorption of Ukraine, it is only a question of years when Taiwan will be invaded. In the U.S.A., prominent Republicans aligned to Trump support Putins attack. This will be a pivotal point for the party which may lead to its imminent breakup. NATO is reacting strongly and relatively efficiently. Turkey is a critical factor - the question has been posed if the Dardanelles might be closed to Russian shipping, rendering most of the Russian navy to Black Sea "bottle ships". That might even be legal after the Russian attack against a Turkish freighter leaving Odessa, but would lead to a NATO standoff, possibly with nuclear arms.
NATO must send additional troops to the Baltics, Poland and Hungary, and then "strongly deny" that any tactical nuclear weapons have been placed in these countries.
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