SD Reports 2021
Report on the consequences of large scale war in Ukraine - 2021.12.06
The S.D.F.M. has, on multiple occasions, issued statements supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. The 2014 Crimea annexation had been predicted by the Capricornian state departement in 2008, documented by a stamp issue of Capricornia Post . The current escalating situation has also been reported on .
This report analyzes the consequences of a renewed large-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine, which by some is expected to take place in the first two months of 2022. Russian troops are being assembled in the Crimea, in the Russian regions bordering Ukraine and in Belarus. Aligned forces are being prepared in the puppet states in Eastern Ukraine and in Transnistria. In Crimea, marine landing forces have been stationed which could be used for a landing in the Odessa region.
Interested parties have published relatively detailed information via the German Bild tabloid . Of course, this may be interpreted as psychological warfare, which it certainly is. But in a time where large scale troop movements and related communication cannot be kept secret anymore, any such attack would be have to be obfuscated by a cloud of psy ops and disinformation, playing on the fact that the Western public is not willing to think about crises radically changing their lifes until it is too late - both the Corona crisis and the Climate crisis and their respective local events with catastrophic consequences are proof of this.
Expected Russian goals
An assumed attack on the scale of the Bild report would certainly target the coastal regions between Crimea and the Donbass, and probably the full Black Sea coastline, occupying Odessa and creating a land link to Transnistria. From the eastern border of Ukraine, there are no significant geographic obstacles until the Dniepr is reached. But then the geography becomes more favourable for a defender - the north western regions of Ukraine have large areas which are forested and swampy, the Carpathian mountains are also difficult, and in the south west, at the border of Romania and Moldova is a region which is basically cut off from the Ukrainian mainland.
Many of these regions are inhabited by strongly national oriented Ukrainians which would not capitulate against Russian occupants, even if the central government would do so or would simply collapse. The western part of the Odessa oblast, at the border of Romania and Moldova, is partly inhabited by Moldavians and even Bulgarians. In case of a collapsing Ukraine, it is well possible that Romanian / Moldovan forces act as a protection force, especially as many refugees from Odessa would be expected to end up in the region. A similar role could be played by Slovak and Polish forces in the Carpathian region.
For Russian occupation forces, the targeted result would be a partitioned Ukraine, with a Free West Ukrainian government on the western side and a Quisling government on the eastern side of the Dnieper, also controlling most of the Black Sea coastline. A full occupation of Ukraine would be possible, initially, but lead to a prolonged guerilla war, with the resistance forces continuously supplied by the West. A more limited occupation, e.g. only occupying the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, and extending Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, would not result in the desired massive weakening of Ukraine, but carry the same political costs. Therefore it is seen as probable that the target would be to occupy about two thirds of the country.
Military assessment
The strength of the Ukrainian forces is difficult to assess. Numerically, the army and volunteer forces are strong and experienced in the static warfare on the Eastern Ukrainian frontline. A direct attack from Crimea would surely be strongly opposed, and attacks from the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts would also meet stiff resistance for some time. The decisive factor is air superiority, with the critical question if the current Ukrainian air defense is operational and how fast modern equipment might be transferred to the frontline. If Ukraine is able to protect its airspace well enough, modern Ukrainian drones might be able to stop heavy ground forces for a sufficient period of time. Also, Russia is limited in its actions by military advisors from Western states present in several regions who would basically be a trip wire. The result might be a "super Donbass", an extended but limited territory claimed by the puppet authorities of Donbass.
It might be possible, though, that Russian diversants and special forces are able to sufficiently disturb Ukrainian forces assembling in the hinterland, allowing the attack to proceed quickly and achieving to reach their goals as described above.
Support of Ukraine
There is an argument that the "North Stream 2" pipeline will be dead if Russia attacks Ukraine. This argument shows that most people do not understand what such a large scale war in the center of Europe means. Yes, it will be dead, but the consequences for trade and finances will be much greater. Russia probably underestimates the willingness of the West to come together in this situation. The seemingly weakened governments in the US, UK, France and Germany can and will use the situation to paint their rightist opponents in Russian colours, as Quislings supporting the aggressor. The difference to 2014 is that at the time, Russia was able to operate in a gray area, while now it would be a clear aggression.
Therefore, it is probable that these governments will decide on extremely harsh measures, cutting off Russia from the Western finance system and blocking all trade through western ports and airports. It is even possible that Russian sea traffic through the Baltic and the Dardanelles will be blocked. The target will be to hit Russia hard enough economically to make the Putin regime fall. This will not happen immediately, of course, and Russia can probably build on Chinese support, but at long term costs.
Ukrainian resistance
Taking into account the history of Ukraine, both in the 20th and the 21st century, it is highly probable that an active and strong resistance movement will emerge in the newly occupied areas, both peacefully and military. In the currently occupied areas, Crimea and Donbass, the majority of citizens already professed a strong allegiance to the former Soviet Union resp. Russia, with the Tatars in Crimea, while posed against Russia, not feeling any strong allegiance towards Ukraine. The loyal Ukrainians in those regions tended to move to free Ukraine untouched by war. In a new war, this will not be possible anymore, and the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians coming under Russian dominance will be much higher. Nationalist volunteer organisations are already existing and can be expected to become the core of a Ukrainian Homeland Army.
The situation in Ukraine is not compareable to Afghanistan, where every invasion in the last 300 years failed. But the relatively small cultural gap between Russian occupants and Ukrainian resistance will make it very difficult for the occupation regime, with consequences radiating out into Russia itself, on a much higher level than during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. The costs to prop up a Quisling regime in Ukraine will be extremely high, hitting a country which will already be under a strict economic blockade. Due to the Donbass war, many young Ukrainians have practical fighting experience. This will be an important factor, compared eg with Belarus where resistance against the home-grown regime remained peaceful and was finally squashed.
Worldwide political consequences
A full scale outbreak of war between NATO and Russia is not seen as probable, because it is in nobodies interest and because NATO countries will try to operate carefully, not being involved directly. An attempt on the side of Russia to take over the Baltic countries would alter that, though, with NATO troops then moving to direct support of Ukraine and, as long as still possible, the Baltic states. But is is possible, even probable, that in the shadow of the Ukraine/Russia war, other conflicts would escalate, using the opportunity.
One such theatre might be an invasion of Taiwan by China. This will break down the world wide economy immediately, not only through a trade blockade but also by the destruction or obstruction of Taiwanese chip manufacturers which play an extremely important role. Another theatre might be Iran, which probably would try to reach the status of a nuclear power during the period, while Israel and Saudi Arabia might cooperate to hinder them by an air attack. Oil traffic lanes would be blocked in such a case, also generating economic chaos.
A weakened but dangerous Russia will have regional consequences, too. Its loyal neighbours, like Kazakhstan, might start thinking of protecting themselves by investing in defense. In the case of Kazakhstan, even nuclear arms are a possibility due to its technical capabilities. Regions like Tatarstan and Chechnya might prepare for sovereignty in case Russia breaks down. Similarly, different groups in Belarus may want to use the opportunity of a distracted and weakened Russia to get rid of the Lukashenka dictatorship tainted by support of the Ukraine war. But most critical for Russia could be the price the country might be forced to pay for Chinese support in the Far East.
Summary
The Russian threats against Ukraine are serious and show how far Russia has come down on the path towards a rogue state. In a way, the situation is not that different from 1938/1939, where Germany first made some "grey zone" operations, occupying Austria and the Sudeten areas in Czechia, then all of Czechia, and finally starting WW II with an attack on Poland. The difference is the time scale, which was much more compressed in that case. But for both countries, the overarching goal is to recover territories lost in a "great war", WW I resp, the Cold War. In both countries, the rhetorics of revanchism were everywhere in that phase, up to a point where it would have been difficult to escape the logic of their own propaganda.
This time, though, modern weapon systems able to destroy the world within hours or even minutes are ready. On the other hand,an interconnected world economy exists which would create massive damage for any party starting a large scale war. With the double crisis of Corona and Climate, there is nothing the world needs less than a large scale war in Europe. We do hope that diplomacy and reason will prevail for the time being, although we are pessimistic regarding the long term developments - the instable situations in the region generated under Russian supervision must be resolved at some point in the future, and of course the Climate crisis will generate much worse political and military crises. Any country able to obtain nuclear weapons will believe itself well advised to do so, and to keep them, not giving them up on a simple promise like Ukraine did after the breakup of the USSR.
Update 2022.01.02
The threat has not been reduced, in spite of a series of highest level US-Russian calls and of a number of conferences planned for mid January. According to the web magazine Meduza , a recruitment drive has been started in Q4/2021 for mercenaries, to be deployed in the Donbass. According to this source, response has been not very enthusiastic in spite of high wages offered. FM analysts see this as an attempt to provide occupation forces, to avoid diluting the Russian Army units on the front. Both the ongoing ramp up of Russian forces and the mercenary recruitment point to a planned attack date in the first half of February. This matches the climate data analysis (based on Poltawa), with the average temperature below zero in January and February, but quickly rising over zero in March. Stable sub zero temperatures are a requirement for a fast tank advance. Current predictions until mid January point to warmer weather followed by temperature lows not far below zero.
Update 2022.01.14
Tensions have been growing in the last few days. An attack on Ukrainian government websites took place, with threatening messages left on the websites. On 2022.01.07, one of two fibre connections from Norway to Svalbard was cut. Although there is currently no proof that this was no accident but action by Russian submarine forces, FM analysts hold it to be highly probable that this was both a threatening action and an attempt to reduce data transfer from a number of civilian satellites through the station in Svalbard. We expect more data lines being cut when war breaks out.
The weather forecast for Eastern Ukraine points to average temperatures falling below zero by end of January, but not extremely low and with a wide uncertainty. Another question is when the Omicron wave reaches both Ukraine and Russia - looking at the way it has developed in Western and Eastern Europe, we expect it to hit the region in about 2 to 3 weeks. In a war situation, its destructive force will probably be multiplied.
In Kazakhstan, mentioned in the original analysis, a "revolt" took place which seems to have been a combination of genuine popular protest and a cryptic conflict between old and new elites. CSTO troops were invited by the government, but their withdrawal seems to be as fast as their arrival. President Tokayev was able to oust important supporters of former president Nazarbayev in the process, which might have been the goal of the "revolt". His future actions will have to be closely observed.
Update 2022.01.20
Belarus and Russia are preparing a joint maneuver in Belarus starting on 2022.02.10, with Russian forces currently being deployed in Belarus. SDFM believe the start date for the maneuver might be a ruse, to hide an earlier attack date. At the same time, Russia is moving 5 landing boats from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. An entry to the Black Sea is deemed probable. As they probably will need to be refueled and loaded, they may be used as a time tracker regarding a landing operation near Sevastopol. It is not assured that any such landing operation will commence at the beginning of the conflict, though.
A large scale Russian sea maneuver has also been announced, to take place in several locations, with unknown purpose. According to official U.S. informations , the U.S. have a carrier group operating in the Mediterranean. This might be used to block the Dardanelles in case of war. The other carrier groups are concentrating in Asian waters. It cannot be excluded that their purpose is to deter a Chinese operation against Taiwan, under the cover of an European war. The SDFM has repeatedly warned about the distraction effect: War in one place might lead to conflicts exploding elsewhere as attentions and ressources are dedicated to the first conflict.
Current reactions of the West, especially Germany and the U.S., are clearly insufficient, with Germany not committing anything and President Biden vacillating on reactions in case of a "minor" incursion.
The CoVid data from Johns Hopkins University do show a beginning "Omicron wall" for Russia. Army units assembled in heated tents are a perfect breeding ground. This makes it improbable that an attack will be delayed into the second half of February or later, as an expected Russian case number of around 1 million per week will make operations difficult. It might even be an argument for calling off the operation entirely.
More detailed data is available from Reuters
Another factor determining an attack date might be the moon phase - on 2022.02.01 there is a new moon, which, together with expected cloudy weather which helps to hide infrared emissions, gives perfect coverage for a surprise attack. This might have been less of a factor, or actually a disadvantage, for earlier wars (WW II started shortly after a full moon), but with modern night vision equipment, an attacker would be able to launch an operation even in full darkness while being invisible for an extended period to the defender.
Combining all factors, psychological ones (Olympics, Year of the Tiger) and more tangible ones like the Omicron wave, the weather and the buildup process of forces, we expect the start of the operation to be on or around 2022.02.01. Speznas operations and electronic / info warfare might precede the major attack for about 24h. Some of those operations might be directed also against the West, e.g. cutting of Internet cables and electronic warfare.
The SDFM , FADO and JSF have set up a Joint Crisis Observation Team under Gen. A. Guha, CDF / JSF.
Update 2022.01.24
While the basic situation has not changed, tensions have risen, with evacuations of diplomatic personell by the U.S. and UK starting this week, and large transports of modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons arriving in Ukraine. The JCOT would like to recommend a detailed analysis by CSIS regarding the various scenarios of a potential war. A second analysis by Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, can be found at warontherocks.com . The analysis basically comes to the same conclusions as the SDFM Report.
Two observations have been derived from this and other sources. Firstly, the Russian support of the Syrian government in the Syrian Civil War can be seen as a historic parallel to the German support of Franco in the Spanish Civil War. The most striking parallel, from a military viewpoint, is that both conflicts were used as "training grounds" for the air force, exposing pilots to real war situations.
The second observation is that Ukraine has made great strides in modernizing the army with guided ammunition and the marine defense with anti-ship missiles. This makes it probable that any invasion will take a long time, with the aggressor incurring high losses. There are gaps in the defense, especially in air defense, though, and the long border between Ukraine and Russia / Belarus is difficult to defend. But an extended war with unoccupied territories in western Ukraine will mean a flow of advanced weapons from the U.S. and Europe which Russia is unable to stop.
Unluckily, the recent improvements of Ukrainian defensive abilities might increase the probability of an invasion in 2022, as Russian decision makers will assume that an attack will become even more difficult in the coming years, especially as large scale armies and heavy tanks will become ever more vulnerable to modern drone technology.
If Belarus does participate in a conflict, as expected, it will mean the Belarus government will be fully responsible for war crimes, same as the Russian government. Basically, this will make it a hostage to Russia and end Belarusian independence. Hopefully, Belarusian military commanders are aware of this, and willing to act to protect the sovereingty of their nation, either through direct action or passive resistance.
Finally, an analysis has been made on the Ukrainian nuclear power plants and nuclear technology abilities. Ukraine has got a number of nuclear power plants dispersed over the country, two of those in the north west. A critical facility is the one near Zaporizhzhia / Nikopol, which is located on the eastern bank of the Dnepr. A number of nuclear companies are located in Kiev. The JCOT believes those ressources are critical, especially if Russia plans to split Ukraine.
Further updates and analyses will be published on the Joint Crisis Observation Team site .
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